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INTRODUCTION
Nearly twenty years ago, when Lord Denning retired after having held
high judicial office for the best part of four decades, I was asked to write a
short piece for the journal of the Law Society of King's College, London.
I reflected then that it had been a great stroke of good fortune for me to
have spent so much of my teaching career in a period when our greatest
innovator was in full cry, springing a fresh surprise every time that one
opened the week's instalment of law reports.' The students held him in
special regard, not just because they admired the "bold spirit" who was
never afraid to speak his mind and press the case for change, often with a
mischievous disregard for the niceties of precedent, but perhaps even
more because his lucid prose, full of short sentences and words of one
syllable, made immediate sense to them and in their view made it quite
unnecessary to read the judgements of his brethren - regardless sometimes
of the fact that theirs was the majority opinion and his the dissent.2
Lord Denning began life on the bench as a divorce judge, before moving
to the King's Bench Division. He did not ever sit in the Commercial Court
or what is today the Companies Court. However, his influence on the
commercial law of his day was immense, through the changes which he
spearheaded both in the general law of contract and those more
specifically affecting commercial law and practice. Although in the minds
of most of us he is best remembered as the champion of the underdog - the
• 5J Berwin Professor Emeritus of Corporate Law, Cambridge
IRe-reading the piece, I do seem to have allowed myself to be somewhat carried away:
"However arid the topic or hung-over the lecturer, however unsocial the teaching hour, one
has only to mention the name to sense the quickening of interest; and the biros drive across
the pages, desperate to ensure that not a syllable of wisdom is lost. And the lecturer, whether
he endorses or dares to disown the opinions of the Master he is quoting, rides on a cloud, and
briefly joins the immortals" (1980) 32 King's Counsel 29.
2 The appeal of these qualities is not confined to students. As a compiler of casebooks in the
two areas covered by this paper, I have found myself, time and again, selecting passages from
the Denning judgement rather than those of his concurring colleagues, for reasons of sheer
readability and not necessarily because his was in my view the best exposition of the law.
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consumer, the victim of bureaucracy, the deserted wife - his judgements in
the commercial area show that he was every much as keenly aware of the
special concerns of business and the importance its practitioners attach to
certainty, speed and the absence of technicality. In company law, his role
was limited to a dozen or so cameo appearances, each of them memorable
in itself, but not really sufficient to justify any claim that he has left his
own mark on the subject.
Although in what follows I shall attempt to evaluate Lord Denning's
contributions to my fields of the law topic by topic, I have chosen also to
group the cases in such a way as to highlight as well some of the
characteristics which have marked him out as someone out of the
ordinary, as man and as judge, during his long spell in office. Greatest
above all of these qualities, I would say, has been the ability to sense a
trend whose hour has come - sometimes twenty years or more ahead of
the rest of us, as events have so often shown.3 But coupled with this has
been an uncanny awareness of just how far to go: change which is too
radical or too abrupt runs the risk of being rejected by a world which is
not ready for it.4
In my own view, two of the most important milestones in his
distinguished career date from relatively early days. The first is the
notorious case of L'Estrange v. Graucob Ltd., in which the lady
proprietor of a small-town teashop was held liable to pay in full for a
machine which never worked properly because she had been conned into
signing a document containing small print by which she waived all her
statutory rights.s The judgement became known as "the canvassers'
charter" and was subsequently hawked around county courts all over the
country by unscrupulous sellers.
I vividly remember Lord Denning confessing to a student audience that,
to his embarrassment, he had been counsel for the successful plaintiff in
L' Estrange v. Graucob and had been so shocked at the injustice of the
decision that he had since spent much time and effort battling to obliterate
the authority of that case and to create scope for the courts to cut down the
3 The most striking example of this is his dissenting judgement in Candler v. Crane,
Christmas & Co. [1951] 2 K.B. 164. Not only was his view vindicated a dozen years later by
the House of Lords in Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. [1964] A.C. 465,
but 27 years further on, when a later House of Lords was poised to disown Anns v. Merton
L.B.C. [19781 A.C. 628 and many of the cases which had followed it, no better basis could be
found for a fresh start than the once-derided Denning dissent of forty years before: see
Caparo Industries pic v. Dickman [1990] 2 A.C. 605 at 621-623, 636, 656-657.
4 We must all surely recall his disarmingly modest words in Combe v. Combe [1951] 2 K.B.
215 at 219: "Much as I am inclined to favour the principle stated in the High Trees case, it is
important that it should not be stretched too far, lest it should be endangered."
5 [1934] 2 K.B. 394.
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effect of unreasonable exemption clauses. 6 The second is his best-known
ruling as a judge of first instance, High Trees, - not so much for what it
decided, although that in itself has proved to be of immense significance,
but because it set the pattern for so many of the innovations that were to
come from his lively imagination: first, the perception of a legal need, a
gap in the law, and a realisation that the time for change was ripe; then the
identification of a slender thread of "authority" hidden in older case-law
which ran contrary to the accepted precedents that appeared to stand in the
way of reform; and finally the bold claim that the latter could be
circumvented or disregarded, for reasons which are at first sight hard to
justify and on further thought just as hard to dismiss.7 The importance of
High Trees in my view is that it showed our iconoclast hero that, given the
will, there could usually be found a way, and illustrated a technique for
introducing reform which he was to hone and perfect in the years to come.
COMMERCIAL LAW
The innovator
I recall an occasion when Lord Denning was asked to name one single
achievement for which he would most wish to be remembered by
posterity, and he replied: "the Mareva injunction."s
The Mareva case itself was the second in the sequence but carries the
greater weight because the first, Nippon Yusen Kaisha v. Karageorgis,
appears not to have been fully argued.9 The issue was, of course, whether
the court would, in the face of many decades of settled practice to the
contrary, grant an injunction to restrain a defendant from moving assets
out of the jurisdiction at a time when the plaintiff had not yet established
his right to proceed against those assets by getting a judgement in his
favour. In each case the court, headed by Lord Denning, ruled that its
discretionary jurisdiction was wide enough to empower it to do so, and
granted the injunction. But in the Nippon case Lord Denning gave an
added reason for making the change: the practice on the continent of
Europe allowed such orders, and the time had come for us to fall into line.
Over the next few years, Lord Denning was able to ensure that he was on
the bench 10 on a number of occasions when the scope of the new
6 See infra n.22 & text.
7 Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd. [1947] K.B. 130.
8 Cf Denning, The Due Process of Law (Butterworths, 1980) (hereafter "Due Process") at
r.134: "the greatest piece of judicial law reform of my time."
Nippon Yusen Kaisha v. Karageorgis [1975] 1W.L.R. 1093;Mareva Compania Naviera
S.A. v. international Bulkcarriers SA [1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 509.
10 "I ... have some say in the constitution of the court": Due Process at p. 7.
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procedure was discussed further: Rasu v. Perusahaan, II when the issues
were debated fully inter partes; The Siskina,12 in which the new procedure
was all but overthrown when his court was reversed by the House of
Lords; Third Chandris Corporation v. Unimarine,13 where The Siskina
was given a restricted interpretation and the Mareva injunction largely
salvaged; and other cases where it was confirmed that Mareva relief lies
against a defendant based in this jurisdiction, that it is available in a tort
action for personal injuries, and so on.14
Alongside the achievement of the Mareva injunction must be ranked the
Anton Piller order, which dates from the same period and which has had
such a dramatic effect in the enforcement of intellectual property rights.15
By empowering an intending plaintiff on an application ex parte to search
the premises of pirates and bootleggers without prior warning, they could
be caught inflagrante delicto in possession oftheir illicit material before
having any chance to get rid of it. Lord Denning proudly claims credit for
his leading part in the cases which established this novel procedure. 16
Perhaps the particular reason why Lord Denning ranks the establishment
of the Mareva injunction as his greatest achievement (apart from its
importance in practice) is that the innovation came about entirely through
the efforts of the judiciary and was established in the face of arguments on
all sides (and open rebuke from the House of Lords 17) that this was a
matter that should be only dealt with by the legislature. But his reply was
always that important reforms could not wait, and that if change was due
he had a duty to do something about it. 18 And after the House of Lords in
Miliangos adopted much the same approach to the question of awarding
judgements in a foreign currency there was less reason for Lord Denning
to feel any inhibitions about taking such a stance. 19
1\ Rasu Maritima S.A. v. Perusahaan [1978] Q.B. 644.
12 Siskina (Cargo Owners) v. Distos Compania Naviera S.A. [1979] A.C. 210 (C.A. and
H.L.).
13 Third Chandris Shipping Corporation v. Unimarine S.A. [1979] Q.B. 645.
14 Lord Denning himself tells the full story in Due Process, Part 4.
15 Anton Piller K.G. v.Manufacturing Processes Ltd. [1976] Ch. 55; cf Ex parte Island
Records Ltd. [1978] Ch. 122.
16 Due Process, at pp.123-130.
17 The Siskina, supra n.12.
18 On more than one occasion he took his cue from a report of the Law Commission
recommending reform, without waiting for action by the legislature: see, e.g. Liverpool City
Council v.Irwin [1976] 1 Q.B. 319. His persistent attempts to introduce a remedy for the
third-party beneficiary of a contract made between other parties, based on the Law Revision
Committee's recommendation of 1937, are another example: see Denning, The Discipline of
Law (Butterworths, 1979) (hereafter "Discipline") at p.289. His views were roundly
condemned by Lord Simonds in Midland Silicones Ltd. v. Scruttons Ltd. [1962] A.C. 446.
19 Miliangos v. George Frank (Textiles) Ltd. [1976] A.C. 443. (Miliangos itself drew support
from the Court of Appeal's earlier judgement in Schorsch Meier G.m.b.H. v. Rennin [1975]
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The internationalist and comparativist
In the Mareva developments, Lord Denning openly took the view that
English law should keep in step with developments in other jurisdictions.
And he was also astute to anticipate, far sooner than most of us, how
extensively the "incoming tide" of European Community law would find
ways of permeating our traditionallaw.2o There are many instances in his
judgements of his drawing on the laws of other countries to give
inspiration or impetus to change which he considered was due.21
The campaigner
Of course, it was not always the case that Lord Denning succeeded in
bringing about reform to the law by judicial means. His attempts to
rewrite the law of mistake or to free contract law from the constraints of
the doctrine of privity, for instance, did not receive wholehearted support.
For more radical changes of this kind, nothing short of legislation is likely
to be effective. But, as so often, he was simply ahead of his time in
appreciating the need for reform; and it must be a source of some
satisfaction for him to know that privity, for instance, did eventually come
on to the Law Commission's agenda and that reform is in the air.
In some cases, and most notably in regard to exemption clauses, his
endeavours bore fruit while he was still on the bench. From being counsel
in L'Estrange v. Graucob to seeing the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977
on the statute-book was, for him, a long and tortuous journey; but he was
able, in his last judgement in this area (the George Mitchell case), to
express satisfaction at the outcome and at the part that he and his fellow
judges had played towards bringing it about.22 In this case he refers to the
"secret weapon" (the "true construction of the contract") which, used
"with great skill and ingenuity" could defeat any exemption clause which
Q.B. 416, in which Lord Denning and his brethren had "turned a blind eye" to House of Lords
authority (Discipline at p.305).)
20 H.P. Bulmer Ltd. v. J. Bollinger S.A. [1974] Ch. 401 at 418.
21 See, e.g. Trendtex Trading Corporation v. Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] Q.B. 529 at 555-
556, where he drew on the laws of several foreign countries in formulating a revised doctrine
of sovereign immunity.
22 George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd. v. Finney Lock Seeds Ltd. [1983] Q.B. 284. On appeal,
when the ruling was affirmed by the House of Lords, Lord Diplock paid a handsome tribute:
"I cannot refrain from noting with regret, which is, I am sure, shared by all members of the
Appellate Committee of this House, that Lord Denning M.R. 's judgement in this case ... is
probably the last in which your Lordships will have the opportunity of enjoying his eminently
readable style of exposition and his stimulating and percipient approach to the continuing
development of the common law to which he has himself in his judicial lifetime made so
outstanding a contribution." [1983] 2 A.c. 803 at 810.
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would give rise to an unreasonable result. 23With the enactment of the
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, "we reach, after long years, the principle
which lies behind all our striving" - the test of reasonableness to which
recourse could be had openly under the statute rather than by the more
devious means used up until then.
Judicial discretion and interventionism
One does not need to study Lord Denning's judgements for long before
discovering how strongly he felt the need for judges to have greater
powers to intervene in a discretionary way in order to dispense better
justice where the circumstances require it. The rigidity of many of the
classifications established in the law was, to him, a tiresome obstacle; and
so were many other traditional constraints, such as the necessity in matters
of contract to have regard to the presumed intention of the parties. So we
see him giving short shrift to the distinction between terms and "mere"
representations;24 rejecting the "officious bystander" test as a yardstick for
the implication of additional terms;25 bringing equitable doctrines in to
supplement the common-law rules as to common mistake26 and waiver27
and freely using the rules of construction so as to make a contract to
supply water at fixed rates for an unlimited period (which the ravages of
inflation had made unprofitable) subject to an implied term that it was
determinable on reasonable notice.28
Judicial techniques which enable the court to dispense discretionary
justice, such as the use of the power to imply terms into a contract, can
obviously strike at the very foundations of contract law if used too freely
or irresponsibly. Although it must have come hard for him, this does seem
to be a lesson which Lord Denning learnt early on in his dealings with
commercial transactions, at least in the area of frustration. In the British
Movietonews case Lord Denning, soon after his elevation to the Court of
23 [1983] Q.B. 284 at 297.
24 See generally Discipline at pp.270-276.
25 Liverpool City Council v. Irwin [1976] 1 Q.B. 319: see Discipline at pp.37-40. But in this
judgement he was held to have strayed too far from orthodoxy by the House of Lords (who,
however, upheld the Court of Appeal's actual decision on the point): [1977] A.C. 239.
26 Solle v. Butcher [1950] 1K.B. 671.
27 In Discipline at pp.209-214, Lord Denning describes how the High Trees principle was
developed, particularly in relation to commercial transactions, so as first to get rid of the
necessity for writing under the (then) Sale of Goods Act (Plasticmoda Societa per Azioni v.
Davidsons (Manchester) Ltd. [1952] 1Lloyd's Rep. 527) and, secondly, to overcome the
limitations of the common law doctrine of waiver by eliminating the need for a party to have
actual knowledge of a breach of contract before the doctrine could apply (Panchaud Freres
S.A. v. Etablissements General Grain Co. [1970] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 53 - "probably the case most
frequently cited in the Commercial Court, although the text-book writers hardly notice it").
28 Staffordshire A.H.A. v. South Staffordshire Waterworks Co. [1978] 1W.L.R. 1387.
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Appeal, sought to restate the doctrine of frustration by saying: "In these
frustration cases, ... the court really exercises a qualifying power ... in
order to do what is just and reasonable in the new situation.,,29 The House
of Lords would have none of this, and not only reversed the court below,
but administered a sharp rebuke, emphasising that "No court has an
absolving power." Although in other contexts Lord Denning was often not
deterred from continuing to press a heterodox line of thought despite the
displeasure of the Lords, we do not see in his later cases any attempt to
reassert the "just and reasonable" basis for the doctrine of frustration in
commercial cases.30 Indeed, generally speaking,3] he showed a good deal
of restraint in not seeking to erode the principle of freedom of contract in
transactions between commercial parties, and a keen appreciation of the
businessman's priorities and the traditions of the Commercial Court.32
Statutory interpretation
Hand-in-hand with Lord Denning's concern to see greater scope for
discretionary intervention in many areas of law was his enthusiastic
endorsement of a purposive approach towards statutory interpretation. He
tells about it in The Discipline of Law. 33For this he was roundly
condemned by the House of Lords: what he was doing was" a naked
usurpation of the legislative function under the thin disguise of
interpretation.,,34 But Lord Denning remained unrepentant and, with a
degree of backing from the report of the Renton Committee,35 continued
to take the same approach in later years.
COMPANY LAW
Corporate personality
As noted above, Lord Denning's reported company law judgements are
few in number but even so, in many ways memorable. Remarkably, one or
two passages continue to be cited - perhaps for the sheer vividness of his
prose - even though they are now considered as being of doubtful
authority. Foremost among these are observations which he made in the
29 British Movietonews Ltd. v. London & District Cinemas Ltd. [1951] 1K.B. 190 (C.A.);
[1952] A.C. 166 (H.L.).
30 See, e.g., Intertradex S.A. v. Lesieur Torteaux S.A.R.L. [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 509.
31 Not, however, in the battle to have unfair exemption clauses outlawed: commercial
considerations seem to have taken second place in cases like Harbutt's "Plasticine" Ltd. v.
Wayne Tank & Pump Co. Ltd. [1970] 1Q.B. 447 and Photo Production Ltd. v. Securicor
Transport Ltd. [1978] 1W.L.R. 856.
32 See Due Process at p.135, and the cases cited supra n.30 and infra n.55.
33 Discipline at pp.9-22. See also Phonogram Ltd. v. Lane, infra n.43 & text.
34 Nimmo v. Alexander Cowan & Sons Ltd. [1968] A.C. 107 at 130.
35 The Preparation of Legislation, Cmnd. 6053 (1975), para. 19.2.
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context of "lifting the veil" of incorporation. Of course, this is just the
kind of area tailor-made for discretionary intervention in the broader
interests of "justice" that he as a judge found irresistible. No-one would
quibble with his condemnation of Dr. Wallersteiner's manipulation of his
Liechtenstein companies:
"I am quite clear that they were just the puppets of Dr
Wallersteiner. He controlled their every movement. Each
danced to his bidding. He pulled the strings. No one else
got within reach of them. ... I am of the opinion that the
court should put aside the corporate veil and treat these
concerns as being his creatures.,,36
In Littlewoods Mail Order Stores Ltd. v. McGregor Lord Denning
declared with gusto that "the courts can, and often do, pull off the mask"
of incorporation?7 But it was in D.H.N. Food Distributors Ltd. v. Tower
Hamlets L.B. C.38 that the disregard of the corporate veil reached an all-
time high, from which we can now see courts in all the Commonwealth
jurisdictions in steady retreat.39 Here we had a group ofthree companies
which "might be called the 'Three in one.' Alternatively, the 'One in
three.' One group of three companies." Lord Denning, drawing support
from a "general tendency to ignore the separate legal entities of various
companies within a group, and to look instead at the economic entity of
the whole group," perceived by Professor Gower,40 declared that the three
companies should be treated as one so that they would not be deprived of
statutory compensation for disturbance. Twenty years on, this decision is
in universal disfavour, but it continues to hold a key place in the textbooks
and students' first-term essays, and even to be cited hopefully (but
invariably in vain) by counsel.
We see similar graphic language in his exposition of the "alter ego"
doctrine in terms which, drawing on a parallel with the human body,
contrasted a company's "brain and nerve centre" with the "hands which
36 Wallersteiner v. Moir [1974] 1 W.L.R. 991 at 1013. The niceties of the principle of
corporate personality were twice ignored by Lord Denning (citing Dicey and Maitland) in
Willis v. Association of Universities of the British Commonwealth [1965] Q.B. 141, once to
accord quasi-corporate status to the unincorporated association and, secondly, to identify that
body with a chartered company which later took over its functions.
37 [1969] 1 W.L.R. 1241 at 1254.
38 [1976] 1 W.L.R. 852 at 857, 860.
39 See, e.g. Woolfson v. Strathclyde Regional Council 1978 S.L.T. 159; Adams v. Cape
Industries plc [1990] Ch. 433; Re Securitibank Ltd. (No.2) [1978] 2 N.Z.L.R. 136 at 158;
Industrial Equity Ltd. v. Blackburn (1977) 137 C.L.R. 567.
40 Modem Company Law, (Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd ed., 1969) at p. 216.
20
COMMERCIAL & COMPANY LAW
hold the tools,,41 -language which, once again, despite having been given
a narrow interpretation by the House of Lords,42 continues to occupy a
major place in any exposition of the subject.
Preincorporation contracts
In Phonogram Ltd. v. Lane an English court was asked for the first time to
give an interpretation to the E.C. First Company Law Directive's
provision dealing with contracts purportedly made on a company's behalf
prior to its incorporation.43 This provision had been incorporated into our
domestic law by the European Communities Act 1972, section 9(2). The
choice was between giving a restrictive or a purposive meaning to the
statutory text - the first having some support from the French version of
the Directive and the second from our own Act. Lord Denning was able to
achieve a satisfying "double" by taking the purposive line (as was his
wont) and flying the patriotic flag at the same time, declaring his
preference for the English rather than the French text.
The minority shareholder
In Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Association Ltd. v. Meyer, this time
from the House of Lords, Lord Denning once again had an opportunity to
launch a new piece oflegislation on its way with a purposive shove.44
This was the first time a case (at least, a reported case) had come before
the court on section 210 ofthe Companies Act 1948 (now section 459 of
the 1985 Act) - which empowers the court to grant discretionary relief
where minority shareholders have been the victim of "oppression" or
"unfairly prejudicial conduct." Given an underdog plaintiff and an open-
ended discretion, it is not any great surprise that he went out of his way to
endorse the new jurisdiction in enthusiastic terms, and in the case itself
see the minority shareholders fully compensated. Unfortunately, his junior
brethren who sat in the Chancery courts in the sixties and seventies did
not share his empathy with aggrieved minority shareholders or his
enthusiasm for unfettered discretionary powers, and the consequence was
that section 210 failed in its purpose and had to be totally recast in 1980.
Mr. Moir, the minority shareholder in the two Wallersteiner cases, also
received generous treatment at the hands of Lord Denning.45 The first, in
which Wallersteiner endeavoured to stifle inquiries into the management
of his corporate group by issuing a gagging writ, is best known for Lord
41 H.L. Bolton (Engineering) Ltd. v. T.J. Graham & Sons Ltd. [1957] 1 Q.B. 159 at 172.
42 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass [1972] A.C. 153.
43 [1982] Q.B. 928.
44 [1959] A.C. 324.




Denning's observations on lifting the corporate veil, referred to above. In
the second, when Moir had at last got a foot across the threshold and been
able to file pleadings to conunence a derivative action, his impecuniosity
was proving a major obstacle. The Court of Appeal gave its blessing to
the introduction of the "Wallersteiner order," by which the company
which is nominally a defendant to the proceedings but in reality a
surrogate plaintiff is ordered to meet the costs of the shareholder on
whose initiative the action has been brought. Indeed, Lord Denning
himself would have gone further, and made the shareholder's derivative
suit a special exception to the rule (of which he himself was a strong
supporter) which has traditionally opposed the right of counsel to appear
on a contingency-fee basis.
Agency and the interested director
Ever since Royal British Bank v. Turquand in 1856, company law has had
rules which relieve persons who deal with a company from being under
any obligation to check whether the company's internal procedures have
been duly adhered to.46 But these traditional rules have no application
where the person concerned is an "insider," such as a director, who can -
at least in theory - check this sort of thing out for himself. In Hely-
Hutchinson v. Brayhead Ltd. a deal had been done between Brayhead's
chairman (from all accounts, a dominant, larger-than-life personality) and
Hely-Hutchinson in which the former had shown scant regard for
constitutional proprieties.47 The company, pleading that the chairman had
exceeded his authority, sought to disown its obligations to Hely-
Hutchinson, who appeared not to be protected by Turquand because he
had recently been made a director of Brayhead, and so was an insider.
Moreover, he himself had not disclosed his interest to the board, as both
the Companies Act and Brayhead's articles required. Despite these and
other seeming obstacles, ways were found by Lord Denning and his
brethren to distinguish the earlier authorities so that the deserving Hely-
Hutchinson was not left whistling for his money. The difference here, it
was said, was that Hely-Hutchinson was not acting as a director in this
particular transaction: he was on the other side of the negotiating table. So
regard was had to the realities of the situation rather than to the technical
fact that the man happened to be a director - an argument which quite
certainly would not have swayed the House of Lords which decided the
leading case twenty years earlier.48 The non-disclosure point, too, was
held not to stand in Hely-Hutchinson's way, Lord Denning advancing a
view which was not shared by a later Court of Appeal in Guinness pic v.
46 (1856) 6 E. & B. 327.
47 [1968] 1Q.B. 549.
48 See Morris v. Kanssen [1946] A.C. 459.
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Saunders,49 but accepted as correct when that case went to the House of
Lords.5o
D. T.l. inspectors' inquisitorial powers
In two cases involving Mr. Robert Maxwell, later to become a figure of
international notoriety, Lord Denning appears in what at first sight is a
surprisingly hawkish light; but I believe that we can understand the reason
for this.51 Mr. Maxwell and his fellow-directors had been made the subject
of an investigation by inspectors appointed by the Secretary of State, and
they had refused to answer questions unless they were first given
assurances that, in effect, the proceeding would be conducted as if it were
a judicial inquiry. They received little sympathy from Lord Denning's
court: the inspectors were expected to act fairly, but were not to be
constrained by rules of law. In effect, the directors were sent packing and
told to face up to their responsibilities, like so many schoolboys. I think
that in taking this view Lord Denning would have been all too conscious
of the exposed position which he had found himself in some years
previously in the Profumo inquiry, where in a rather similar way he was
required to hold an inquisition following a major public scandal, without
any clear directions as to how the matter should be handled. His report
would inevitably involve findings, possibly of a criminal nature, against
persons who might reasonably protest that they had not had the protection
of a criminal trial. He had to get on with the task as best he could, keenly
aware that whatever he did was bound to attract criticism; and so
understandably he identified with the D.T.I. inspectors rather than with
the citizens summoned to appear before them.
Role of the company secretary
When the precedents stand in the way of change, the bold spirit must
sometimes confront them head on. Faced on the one hand with a
fraudulent company secretary who had exposed his company to
commitments in excess of his authority, and on the other with precedents
to the effect that "A secretary is a mere servant; his position is to do what
he is told, and no person can assume that he has any authority to represent
anything at all,••52 Lord Denning's response was: ''Times have changed. A
49 [1988] 1W.L.R. 863.
50 [1990] 2 A.C. 663. (Failure to comply with the statutory obligations of disclosure has
criminal sanctions but no civil consequences.)
5\ Re Pergamon Press Ltd. [1971] Ch. 388; Maxwell v. D.T.I. [1974] Q.B. 523. See also
Norwest /lolst Ltd. v. Secretary of State for Trade [1978] Ch. 201, in which the Secretary of
State was held not bound to observe the rules of natural justice in determining whether or not
to appoint inspectors.
52 Barnett v. South London Tramways Co. (1887) 18 Q.B.D. 815 at 817.
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company secretary is a much more important person nowadays .... He is
no longer a mere clerk. He regularly makes representations on behalf of
the company and enters into contracts on its behalf which come within the
day-to-day running ofthe company's business. So much so that he may be
regarded as held out as having the authority to do such things on behalf of
th ,,53ecompany.
CONCLUSION
The company law cases to which I have referred are typical illustrations
of Lord Denning's contribution to the law of his and our time. Company
law has its roots in the nineteenth century and has been served by
Chancery judges largely of a conservative and risk-averse disposition.
There was scope for a breath or two of fresh air, and he took the
opportunity to give a lead in the relatively few cases that came before
him.
In commercial law, although some of his judgements have not escaped
criticism, 54 it is generally true to say that he was keenly appreciative ofthe
important part that English law, with its laissez-faire traditions, continues
to play in the world of merchandising and shipping, banking and
insurance, and his rulings commonly reflect this awareness.55 And if, of
all his contributions, he himself would single out the Mareva injunction to
have as a memorial, I am sure that few practitioners in the Commercial
Court would wish to disagree.
53 Panorama Developments (Guildford) Ltd. v. Fidelis Furnishing Fabrics Ltd. [1971] 2 Q.B.
711 at 716.
54 See, e.g. United Dominions Trust Ltd. v. Kirkwood [1966] 2 Q.B. 431 (what is a bank?);
Van Lynn Developments Ltd. v. Pelias Construction Co. Ltd. [1969] 1 Q.B. 607 (notice of
assignment).
55 See, e.g. the Intertradex case, supra n.30 (no frustration of commodity sale); Teheran-
Europe Ltd. v. S.T. Belton (Tractors) Ltd. [1968] 2 Q.B. 545 (implied terms as to quality);
Trans Trust S.P.R.L. v. Danubian Trading Co. Ltd. [1952] 2 Q.B. 297 and Pavia & Co.
S.p.A. v. Thurmann-Nielsen [1952] 2 Q.B. 84 (opening of credit); Arab Bank Ltd. v. Ross
[1952] 2 Q.B. 216 (irregular indorsement); British Crane Hire Corpn. Ltd. v. Ipswich Plant
Hire Ltd. [1975] Q.B. 303 (incorporation of usual trade terms).
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